We study asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple objects where players'values for the objects are common knowledge. The players have di¤erent values for the objects but they have the same ranking. The contest designer may award one prize including all the objects to the player with the highest e¤ort, or, alternatively, he may allocate several prizes, each prize including one object such that the …rst prize is awarded to the player with the highest e¤ort, the second prize to the player with the second-highest e¤ort, and so on until all the objects are allocated. We analyze the distribution of e¤ort in one-prize and multiple-prize contests and show that allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who maximizes the total e¤ort.
Introduction
In all-pay auctions each player submits a bid (e¤ort) for the object being sold, the player who submits the highest bid receives the object, but, independently of success, all players bear the cost of their bids. Common applications of allpay auctions include rent-seeking, lobbying in organizations, R&D races, political contests, promotions in labor markets, and sport competitions. In the economic literature, all-pay auctions are usually studied under complete information where the players'valuations for the object are common knowledge (see, for example, Hillman and Samet (1987) , Hillman and Riley (1989) , Baye et al. (1993) and Che and Gale (1998)), or under incomplete information where each player's valuation for the object is private information to that player and only the distribution of the players' valuations is common knowledge (see, for example, Hillman and Riley (1989) , Amman and Leininger (1996) , Gavious et al. (2003) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006) ). Most of this literature has focused on all-pay auctions with a unique prize that is awarded to the player with the highest e¤ort. In the real world, however, we can …nd numerous contests with several prizes. For example, students compete for grades in exams (at least in U.S, the grades are A's, B's, C's, D's and F's). Players in sport competitions may compete for a unique prize or they may compete for several prizes, i.e., gold, silver or bronze medals awarded in the Olympic games. In political races the winner may hold a position with several titles, or several winners may hold these titles separately. Large corporations (such as large banks) have, besides a single president, several executive vice presidents, tens of senior vice-presidents , and several hundred "mere" vice-presidents.
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In the literature on all-pay auctions only a few studies deal with the question of what is the optimal number of prizes in contests and particularly in all-pay auctions.
2 Moldovanu and Sela (2001) showed that in all-pay auctions under incomplete information when cost functions are linear or concave in e¤ort, it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single …rst prize, but when cost functions are convex, several positive prizes may be optimal. This explanation, however, cannot be generalized to the case of all-pay auctions under complete information. In symmetric all-pay auctions under complete information, Barut
and Kovenock (1998) showed that the revenue maximizing prize structure allows any combination of k 1 prizes, where k is the number of players. That is, the contest designer is indi¤erent to whether he should allocate one prize or several prizes. In this paper we show that in asymmetric all-pay auctions under complete information allocation of several prizes might be pro…table for the contest designer who maximizes the total e¤ort. Consequently, this paper o¤ers a rationale for multi-prize contests in a single, integrated model. Baye et al. (1996) provided a complete characterization of equilibrium behavior in the complete information all-pay auction with one object. Clark and Riis (1998) analyzed multiple object all-pay auctions where the objects are iden- 1 The position of vice-president job is often considered to be a consolation prize. valuations is more complicated and there is no complete characterization of the equilibrium behavior in this environment. In our model of multiple object allpay auctions both the players and the objects are asymmetric. The players have di¤erent values for the objects but they have the same ranking, and the players'valuations for the objects are common knowledge. The contest designer may award one prize, including all the objects, to the player with the highest e¤ort or, alternatively, he may allocate several prizes, each prize including one object such that the …rst prize is awarded to the player with the highest e¤ort, the second prize to the player with the second-highest e¤ort, and so on until all the objects are allocated. Although we are not able to provide a complete characterization of a designer's preferences among one-prize and multiple-prize contests, we do show that if players have di¤erent valuations for the objects, allocation of several prizes may be optimal for a contest designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort.
The contest designer may have other goals in addition to maximizing the expected total e¤ort. For example, he may wish to determine the identity of the winners of the contest. 3 We demonstrate that by allocating several prizes, the contest designer can drastically change the e¤ort distribution of the players and accordingly the players'probabilities of winning such that the player with the lowest probability (zero) of winning the one-prize contest may have the highest probability of winning the highest prize and also the highest probability of winning one of the prizes in the multiple-prize contest. Hence, if the contest designer wishes to in ‡uence the identity of the winners of the contest, it might be worthwhile to allocate several prizes.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present our model of multiple-prize all-pay auctions. In Section 3 we review the results of all-pay auctions with a unique prize, and then analyze asymmetric all-pay auctions with two prizes. In Section 4 we compare the e¤ort distribution in one and two-prize contests. In Section 5 we gather concluding comments. Some proofs appear in an Appendix.
The Model
We consider an all-pay auction with n players and p objects. The value of the j-th object for player i is v Each player i makes an e¤ort x i : These e¤orts are submitted simultaneously, and all contestants incur the cost of their e¤ort. The contest designer who wishes to maximize the expected value of the total e¤ort (E(
by the players determines the number of prizes, where each prize may include a combination of objects. We restrict the designer's decision such that he can decide between two designs: a one-prize contest in which the player with the highest e¤ort wins all the p objects, and p-prize contests in which the player with the highest e¤ort wins the …rst object (object 1); the player with the second highest e¤ort wins the second object (object 2); and so on, until all the objects are allocated.
Equilibrium
In order to decide what the optimal number of prizes is in our model, we …rst analyze the players' strategies in equilibrium. We consider an all pay auction with a single object in which the player with the highest e¤ort wins the object.
Let v i be the value of player i for the object. The e¤ort distribution functions of the players F i (x); i = 1; 2; :::; n; are given by the following system of equations: 
Thus, player 1's e¤ort is uniformly distributed, while player 2 's e¤ort is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
Given these mixed strategies, player 1's winning probability against 2 is
Player 1's expected e¤ort is v2 2 , and player 2's expected e¤ort is
. Therefore the total expected e¤ort is
and the respective expected payo¤s are u 1 = v 1 v 2 and u 2 = 0:
Next we consider an all-pay auction with two objects in which the player with the highest e¤ort wins the …rst object and the player with the second highest e¤ort wins the second one. Let v j i be the value of player i for object j; j = 1; 2. The e¤ort distribution functions of the players F i (x); i = 1; 2; :::; n;
are given by the following system of equations:
Since it is very complex to solve this system of equations for the general case of asymmetric players, we consider the case of n 1 symmetric players with the same valuations for the objects and only one player with di¤erent valuations than the others. In formal terms, player 1 has values of v 
Thus the e¤orts of players 2 and 3 are distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
It can be veri…ed that The e¤ort distribution function of player 1 is given by
Thus the e¤ort of player 1 is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function
where F 23 (x) is given by (4). It can be veri…ed that 8 We now compare two contest designs with two objects in order to show that allocation of a single prize may be not pro…table for a contest designer who maximizes the total e¤ort exerted by the players. 4 In the two-prize contest, the player with the highest e¤ort wins object 1 and the player with the second highest e¤ort wins object 2. In the one-prize contest, the player with the highest e¤ort wins objects 1 and 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that three are not necessarily equivalent, however, the one-prize contest is not always the optimal design for the contest designer who wishes to maximize the expected total e¤ort.
Proposition 1
The expected total e¤ ort in the two-prize contest may be higher than the expected total e¤ ort in the one-prize contest.
Proof. Suppose that in the status quo all the players have the same valuations for the objects such that v this case both designs coincide and the total e¤ort is equal to v. Now we change 4 It is important to note that although our result is not general it is much more robust than any numerical example.
the valuation of player 1 for object 2 such that v
Lemma 2 In the one-prize contest, an increase of player 1's valuation for object 2 yields a decrease of the expected total e¤ ort.
Proof. See in the Appendix.
Lemma 3 In the two-prize contest, a small increase of player 1's valuations for object 2 yields an increase of the expected total e¤ ort.
Since the total expected e¤ort in the status quo where the players are symmetric is the same for both one-prize and two-prize contests, by lemmas 2 and In contrast to Proposition 1, it can be shown that the expected total e¤ort in the two-prize contest may also be lower than the expected total e¤ort in the one-prize contest. However, since complete characterization of the equilibrium strategy in the multiple-prize contest is not possible, we cannot de…ne exactly under which conditions the total e¤ort is larger in each of the contest designs.
So far we have assumed that the goal of a contest designer is to maximize the expected total e¤ort. But he may also have other goals. Suppose that he wishes to determine the identity of the winners in the contest. The following result shows that the number of prizes allocated by the designer has a signi…cant e¤ect on determining the identity of the winner(s) of the contest.
Proposition 4
The player with the lowest probability to win the one-prize con-test may have the highest probability to win the two-prize contest.
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Proof. Assume that in the status quo all the players have the same valuations for the objects, i.e., v
Lemma 5 An identical increase of players 2 and 3' valuations for object 2 implies that these players will have the same probability to win the one-prize contest, while player 1 will have a probability of zero to win this contest.
Proof. See in the Appendix. Lemma 6 An identical increase of the valuations of players 2 and 3 for object 2 implies that the probability of each of them to win the two-prize contest is smaller than the probability of player 1 to win this contest.
By lemmas 5 and 6, in the one-prize contest player 1 has a probability of zero to win while in the two-prize contest he has the highest probability of winning the …rst prize and also the highest probability of winning one of the two prizes. 5 Having the highest probability to win the two-prize contest means that the player has the highest probability to win the …rst prize as well as to win one of the prizes. Note that in a case of two players and two prizes each player wins a prize for sure and therefore we need at least three players. F1(x) for V2=0.7
V2-Players 2 and 3's value for the second object Figure 2 Under the assumptions in Proposition 4, if the contest designer does not want player 1 to win he should allocate only one prize. On the other hand, if he wants player 1 to win he should allocate two prizes. Thus, the contest designer can in ‡uence the identity of the winners by his decision on the number of prizes that will be allocated at the contest.
Concluding Remarks
The study of asymmetric all-pay auctions with multiple-prizes under complete information is very complex. Even for the simplest case assumed in this paper where three players compete to acquire two di¤erent prizes, the players' equilibrium strategies cannot be explicitly calculated independently of the players'values for the prizes. Accordingly, the expected total e¤ort exerted by the players in these contests cannot be explicitly calculated. Thus, to compare the distributions of e¤ort in one-prize and two-prize asymmetric all-pay auctions we analyzed the change of the players' distributions of e¤ort with respect to the symmetric case where the total e¤ort is the same for both kinds of contests. One result showed that the total e¤ort exerted by the players may be larger in the two-prize contest than in the one-prize contest. However, the exact relation between any two di¤erent designs would depend on the speci…c parameters of these models, that is, the players' exact valuations for the prizes. The second result
showed that in contrast to the one-prize all-pay auction in which the player with the highest value has the highest probability to win, in multiple-prize contests the identity of the winners as well as the order of the winners according to their probabilities of winning are ambiguous. Therefore, by making a decision on the number of prizes, the contest designer can signi…cantly a¤ect the results of any multiple-prize contest.
Appendix

Proof of Lemma 2
The players' valuations in the one-prize contest are now v 1 = (1 + )v and
Thus, by (2), the change of total e¤ort with respect to the status quo in the one-prize contest is
Note that for all 0; E 1 < 0 and for = 0; we obtain that
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
The players' valuations in the two-prize contest are now v 
Substituting (7) in (6) implies that for = 0; the overall change in the e¤orts of players 2 and 3 is 2 E 23 = 2v 3
Similarly, the change in the e¤ort of player 1 is 
Substituting (9) in (8) implies that for = 0; the change in the e¤ort of player 1 is
Consequently, around = 0; the overall change in the total e¤ort is positive and equals
Proof of Lemma 5
If we slightly change the valuation of players 2 and 3 for object 2 ( v 2 23 = )
we obtain that the players'valuations in the one-prize contest are v 1 = v 1 + v 2 ; v 2 = v 3 = v 1 + v 2 + : According to (1) Players 2 and 3's probability to win the contest will be 1 2 ; whereas player 1's probability to win the contest will be zero.
Proof of Lemma 6
In the status quo, the three players use the same strategies in the two-prize contest and therefore the probability of winning is the same for all the players.
When we slightly increase the valuations of players 2 and 3, players 2 and 3' strategies are not a¤ected (see equation (4)), but player 1's strategy is. Then,
